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The campaign in East and Central Africa during the First World War has received relatively little 
attention despite the remarkable exploits of Major General Edward Northey and Norforce. In field 
command for two and a half years, he successfully led a multi-ethnic and polyglot force across some 
of the most difficult terrain of the war. Exerting strong leadership and overseeing detailed logistical 
planning, Northey was able to maintain an effective force that was consistently able to march and 
fight the German Schutztruppe under von Lettow-Vorbeck.  In contrast to the main body of the British 
East African Force, Norforce maintained its combat effectiveness despite high levels of sickness and 
highly trying climatic conditions. Overall, Northey must be considered the outstanding British general 
of the East African Campaign while Norforce deserves full credit for its singular achievements. 
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1.  Introduction 
Despite increasing scholarly interest, the East African campaign of 1914–1918 has remained one of the 
lesser-studied theatres of the First World War.1 If strategically it was a ‘peripheral’ theatre to the 
European powers, it had an enormous and lasting effect on the region and its inhabitants. The 
environment, physical and human in Africa played a decisive role in determining military success or 
failure: innovation was essential to overcome the extremely limited infrastructure, a largely subsistence 
economy and a subject population of great diversity that had little interest in European quarrels. In a 
theatre with extremes of distance, terrain and climate, military operations had to be carried out very 
differently from those in Europe or the Near East.2 
On the British side, the remarkable achievements of Major General (Maj. Gen.) Edward Northey 
and the Nyasaland and North-Eastern Rhodesia Frontier Force have remained in the shadow of the East 
African Force under General (Gen.) Jan Smuts. This is undeserved as Norforce, as it was usually known 
after its less cumbersome telegraphic address, achieved considerable success through tremendous feats of 
endurance under some of the most demanding conditions in the world. While Northey was a regular 
British officer from the English gentry, his heterogeneous and polyglot troops were drawn from across 
Great Britain, South Africa, Uganda, both Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Southern Rhodesia 
(Zimbabwe) and Nyasaland (Malawi). Despite his command not being much more than a reinforced 
infantry brigade until 1918, Norforce advanced thousands of kilometres during its existence, often with 
detached columns operating up to several hundred kilometres apart with lines of communication 
extending over 1 200 kilometres to the rear. Aided only by a small staff, Gen. Northey was a successful 
commander of a highly capable fighting force that played a crucial role in the conquest of German East 
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Africa as well as the subsequent pursuit of the German Schutztruppe through Mozambique and Northern 
Rhodesia.3 Furthermore, Norforce’s organisational success was in sharp contrast to the administrative 
failures that bedevilled British columns operating from British East Africa throughout much of 1916. 
This article attempts to redress the imbalance through a description and assessment of Edward Northey’s 
tenure in command of Norforce.  
 
2. The strategic situation 
At the outbreak of war in August 1914, the British East African territories were of marginal strategic 
importance to the empires that were about to engage in a titanic struggle in Europe.4 These virtually 
undeveloped regions were controlled by the Colonial Office, which governed through a small number of 
European officials who collected taxes from the substantial numbers of indigenous Africans. The 
economy was overwhelmingly agricultural and largely subsistence-based with manufactured goods 
having to be imported by sea. European settlement was sparse and isolated with poor communication 
networks, making journeys take weeks rather than days. Colonial control was exerted through locally 
raised military units and paramilitary police commanded by whites. There were a total of three battalions 
of the King’s African Rifles (KAR) in East Africa, totalling nearly 2 400 soldiers of which only the Depot 
and three companies of 1st Battalion KAR (1st KAR) were based in Nyasaland with the remainder in 
Uganda and British East Africa.5 Northern Rhodesia was little better off with some 450 members of the 
paramilitary Northern Rhodesian Police (NRP) to cover its vast expanse and extensive frontier with 
German East Africa. Altogether, there were fewer than 1 000 military and police available to secure a 
border in excess of 480 kilometres. 
Across the frontier, the forces in German East Africa were comparable to the KAR with 2 600 
troops organised in 14 companies of the Schutztruppe, although there were barely 150 along the southern 
border with a platoon at Bismarckburg (Kasanga) and a company near Neu Langenburg (Tukuyu). They, 
too, suffered from poor physical communications and were reliant on a heliograph system to link Neu 
Langenburg to Iringa and then Kilossa, the site of the nearest telegraph station.6 However, if they were 
not in the position to launch a full-scale invasion, the Schutztruppe were vigorously led and quite capable 
of threatening vulnerable frontier posts. For both sides, their units were very lightly equipped, as they had 
to operate in the African bush with their supplies and equipment carried by indigenous Africans, known 
as ‘carriers’ or ‘porters’. There was no artillery or advanced military equipment as these troops were 
intended to enforce colonial rule and not to face a modern enemy in general war. Overall, the region was 
a military backwater that was entirely unprepared for major conflict. 
With the outbreak of war, British strategy concentrated on seizing the German seaports along the 
Indian Ocean coast in order to neutralise the latter’s naval raiders. Significant reinforcements in the form 
of two brigades of Indian infantry were despatched to British East Africa, but poor preparation and an 
underestimation of the Schutztruppe led to the debacle at Tanga on 30 October–2 November 1914. Faced 
by a strong enemy, London ordered the forces in East Africa over to the defensive on which they 
remained for the rest of the year and much of 1915.7  
For their part, the Germans had reinforced the southern border, gaining command of Lake 
Tanganyika, thereby threatening Abercorn (Mbala) and the north-eastern portion of the border whereas 
the British had achieved supremacy on Lake Nyasa (Malawi). An attack on Karonga, in northern 
Nyasaland on 9 September 1914 was countered decisively by 1st KAR, but underlined the paucity of 
forces along the border.8 The hopes of the Colonial Office that the landings at Tanga would relieve the 
pressure in the south were dashed by the failure there and it now had to turn to its own resources for 
military manpower. The British authorities lacked vision: they were reluctant to expand the KAR, for 
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financial reasons, while also hesitating to train large bodies of African forces for fear of potentially 
undermining colonial rule. Even the overwhelming military logic of having a single officer to command 
all the British forces in the region was rejected owing to departmental rivalry.9 
The year 1915 opened in an uneasy stalemate. In January, Nyasaland was shaken by an African 
uprising between Zomba and Blantyre led by John Chilembwe. The revolt was quickly suppressed by 
1st KAR and settlers, but it underlined the fragility of British rule and the scarcity of military forces. 
Both sides struggled to maintain detached fighting columns scattered over vast distances and backed 
by poor lines of communication. The Germans had reinforced to the equivalent of about five companies 
totalling about 500 soldiers based in the garrisons of Bismarckburg and Neu Langenburg, themselves 
320 kilometres apart, while the British could barely muster 500 in Nyasaland and a similar number in 
Northern Rhodesia. Interestingly enough, it was the Belgians who had the greatest power with three 
battalions numbering more than 1 500 men based in the Katanga Province of their Congo territory. The 
Portuguese remained officially non-belligerent and held a number of isolated detachments throughout its 
Mozambique colony, which were of virtually negligible fighting power.  
At the same time, a similar threat emerged in the east when troops from Bismarckburg attacked 
Abercorn in Northern Rhodesia. With British reinforcements still some distance away, the local 
magistrate sought and obtained support from the Belgian forces in the neighbouring Congo. By the end of 
the month, more than a battalion’s worth of Belgians were helping to secure the frontier together with 150 
rifles of the NRP.10 While militarily necessary, this development, mirrored by similar offers of assistance 
by the Portuguese, was not viewed favourably by the Colonial Office; it recognised the threat posed by 
the Germans, but was determined to avoid calling on external support unless absolutely vital.11 
Nevertheless, as the office with responsibility for the raising, controlling and funding of local defence 
forces, it had to find a workable solution. With the heavy fighting in Europe, the War Office could 
provide no extra troops while the Colonial Secretary was determined to retain control of the operations.12  
In May, the Belgian and British governments approved a plan to send Royal Navy motorboats 
overland from South Africa to attack the Germans on Lake Tanganyika. This was intended to relieve the 
pressure on Northern Rhodesia and Congo, but would take at least seven months to come to fruition.13 It 
was, however, a substantial German raid against the post of Saisi, north of Abercorn, in late July 1915 
that raised the temperature. Threatened with increasing German activity, the Colonial Office was forced 
into action, as it authorised the raising of 300 men from Rhodesia as well as inveigling the South African 
(SA) government into raising a contingent of 1 500 for service in the region.14  
By the end of the year, British policy towards Africa was in considerable flux, with some ministers 
and senior officers working surreptitiously to overturn Lord Kitchener’s defensive policy there. Despite 
the former’s strong opposition, the Cabinet formally agreed to the invasion and ultimate conquest of 
German East Africa to start early in the following year. The bulk of the additional forces were to be 
provided by South Africa, which would raise and despatch a substantial expeditionary force to British 
East Africa.15 
Lord Buxton, the High Commissioner for Southern Africa, was aware that the forthcoming arrival 
of the Tanganyika Naval Expedition plus the raising of a Rhodesian contingent would increase British 
military power significantly. Equally, he was concerned about keeping relations with the Belgians 
harmonious and proposed that a senior British officer for Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland should 
command both countries’ troops in the region.16 These concerns forced the hand of the Colonial Office 
and on 13 October 1915, the Secretary of State, Andrew Bonar Law, requested the War Office to supply a 
suitable candidate.17 However, owing to external events, it was not until the end of November, that an 
officer could be chosen as the commander of the regional forces.18 
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3. Brigadier General Edward Northey 
The man selected for this new appointment was a little-known infantry officer, Brigadier General (Brig. 
Gen.) Edward Northey, lately of the King’s Royal Rifle Corps (KRRC).19 Aged 47 in 1915, he was a 
clergyman’s son, educated at Eton and Sandhurst before joining his regiment in 1888. He was posted to 
1st KRRC, served in India, and subsequently fought in several frontier campaigns before being promoted 
to captain in 1895. He served throughout the whole of the Second Anglo-Boer War, receiving two 
mentions in dispatches. On return to Britain, he was then posted as the adjutant of a Volunteer Battalion 
and gained experience of dealing with non-regular soldiers. He returned to the First Battalion in 1904, 
and his career continued to go well, being appointed as major and then in 1911, as lieutenant colonel and 
commanding officer.20  
Three years later, he led 1st KRRC to France as part of the British Expeditionary Force and took 
part in the retreat from Mons as well as the heavy fighting on the Marne, the Aisne and 1st Ypres. 
Northey conducted himself well, being mentioned in despatches. However, on 27 September 1914, he 
was wounded by a German bullet, as he helped to repel an attack on his battalion headquarters, and was 
evacuated to the rear. Just more than two months later, he had recovered and was back in command of 
his unit in the front line.21 Northey’s efforts were recognised in February 1915 with the receipt of a 
brevet colonelcy and appointment as an extra aide-de-camp to the King. This was quickly followed by 
appointment as a brigadier general and the command of 15th Infantry Brigade on 2 March. Joining his 
new brigade in the trenches near St Eloi, his presence was quickly felt: 
Brigadier visits trenches and finds very much work to be done; Parapets too high and not bullet proof, 
no loopholes for snipers. Very hard work put in; trenches improved & approaches; support & 
communication trenches constructed.22 
This was to be characteristic of Northey’s command style; he visited the front frequently, casting 
an expert eye over his troops and their work. His energy was to prove critical as less than two weeks 
later, 15th Brigade was engaged in the heavy fighting around ‘The Mound’, suffering over 800 casualties 
in a month. In April, his thoroughness and preparations paid off in the successful attack on Hill 60. 
Throughout the spring of 1915, Northey and his brigade had their fair share of privations in the trenches 
interspersed with hard fighting. However, by late June, his forward style brought him into contact with 
the enemy and he was shot through the thigh while discussing the digging of a new communication 
trench with the brigade major.23  
Chance now played its part in determining his future. Again recovered, on the day that his 
medical board report arrived on the Military Secretary’s desk in London, so did a letter from the 
Colonial Office asking for an experienced officer to command the troops in Northern Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland. Initially seeming like banishment to a remote theatre, Northey soon realised that he had been 
given an independent command that would give full scope for his initiative.24 
It was an intriguing choice, for although he was a highly experienced soldier, apart from his time 
in command of 15th Brigade, Northey had spent 28 consecutive years at regimental duty. He had neither 
the staff experience nor training that might have brought him to greater attention. But, unlike some 
contemporaries, he had not been stultified by the narrowness of regimental life. His was a quick and 
original brain that was open to new ideas while he had a pleasant and likeable personality. Northey had a 
quiet and unassuming manner that was tempered by iron resolve and determination. This was matched 
by an even temper and a concern for his subordinates that caused others to hold him in high regard. In 




   
4. Preparations for the offensive 
With London’s priorities now firmly focused on the offensive through a combined British–Belgian 
invasion of German East Africa, Northey’s mission was adjusted to reflect the new policy. His main task 
was to secure Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland from attack, with instructions to assist the naval 
operations on Lake Tanganyika as well as attack the Germans from the south.26 With optimism that the 
Schutztruppe would be easily defeated and the whole of German East Africa quickly overrun, little 
thought was given to the coordination of the military effort. Northey therefore remained under the orders 
of the Colonial Secretary rather than the War Office, with Smuts’ authority limited to the main force. The 
perils of divided responsibility had been amply demonstrated by the disaster at Tanga nearly a year 
earlier, but Lord Kitchener continued to evade taking on the responsibility that rightly belonged to the 
War Office. It made no sense to have one force under the Colonial Office, which lacked both the 
expertise and resources to direct military operations, while the War Office (which did have that expertise 
and resources) controlled the other, much larger East African Force to the north. Fortunately, Northey had 
the personality and strength of character to satisfy both.  
The commander of Norforce got off to a good start as he journeyed to the front. Stopping in 
South Africa, he made a favourable impression on the Governor General and High Commissioner, Lord 
Buxton: 
General Northey came and stayed with me on his way to German East. I liked him particularly, and I 
think a very excellent selection has been made, for it is obvious that, apart from his military gifts, he 
is a man of great tact and will get on well with the various people with whom he will come into 
contact.27 
Northey then spent a week conferring with the government, calling on both Generals Botha and 
Smuts, before moving north to Southern Rhodesia to meet the Administrator. There, he devoted three 
weeks to the organisation of the lines of communication from the railway terminus to the northern 
frontier. He then moved on to Portuguese East Africa, where he met the Governor General and made 
arrangements for the passage of his troops and supplies through his territory. He arrived in Zomba in 
Nyasaland in late January, where again he stayed for a fortnight to sort out the supply and transport 
system from the River Zambezi to the front. The essential preliminaries complete, Northey only 
reached the forward post of Karonga in northern Nyasaland on 16 February, nearly two months after 
leaving Britain.28  
Northey made full use of his professional experience as he grasped, unlike the military amateur 
Smuts, the vital importance of making adequate logistic preparations before even considering an 
advance in a tropical country.29 His task would be an exceptionally difficult one owing to the limitations 
imposed by geography and climate in a region that was almost completely undeveloped. In contrast to 
British East Africa, there were very few settlers or officials to support the forces or to organise 
indigenous African labour. 
The challenges of conducting successful military operations in thinly populated and undeveloped 
regions of Africa had long been recognised. While mobile columns could live off the land to some 
extent, this required operating in populated areas and during seasons of plenty. But with subsistence 
agriculture, such methods could not be maintained for extended periods or with large numbers of troops 
as they would quickly eat all the local inhabitants’ food supplies. Furthermore, key items such as 
ammunition, weapons, spares, fuel and technical equipment could not be obtained locally and had to be 
brought forward. Health was compromised by endemic tropical diseases, notably mosquito-borne 
malaria and tsetse fly-borne trypanosomiasis (‘sleeping sickness’); the former caused tremendous 
debilitation and suffering for humans, while the latter invariably killed all domestic livestock, including 
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horses and mules. A railway and one navigable waterway existed, but were not conveniently located to 
support military operations. This meant that, prior to the advent of the motor vehicle, military forces 
were dependent on hired civilian labour, known as carriers, to move all loads (normally carried on the 
head) with their columns. Carriers were not soldiers and normally operated within a fixed radius of their 
homes although they could be engaged for prolonged operations. However, this made desertion more 
likely.30 Finally, matters were made more difficult by the extremes of climate that ranged from tropical 
monsoons to arid desert winds across widely varying terrain and vegetation.  
 
Segment Distance in kilometres Mode of travel 31 
Durban – Beira 1 235 Ocean steamer 
Beira – Chinde 230 Coastal steamer 
Chinde – Chindio 195 Stern-wheeler 
Chindio – Blantyre 280 Railway 
Blantyre – Zomba 70 Lorry 
Zomba – Fort Johnston 130 Carriers (later cars) 
Fort Johnston – Karonga 485 Lake steamer 
Karonga – Mwaya 35 (steamer directly to Mwaya) 
Total 2 660 km  
 Table 1: Norforce lines of communication 
 
In addition to these challenges, Norforce also faced the extremes of distance as its lines of 
communication began in South Africa at the east coast port of Durban where ocean-going ships took on 
cargo and sailed to Beira in Portuguese East Africa. From there, coastal steamers steamed to Chinde at 
the mouth of the Zambezi River. There, personnel and stores were cross-loaded to paddle steamers that 
moved up river to Chindio where they were landed for the rail journey to Blantyre. Between Blantyre 
and Zomba, movement was carried out by trucks until the end of the motor road. Carriers were then 
required to carry stores to Fort Johnston on Lake Nyasa (Malawi) where it was shipped by steamer to 
Karonga (and later Mwaya). This meant a journey of 715 kilometres from the railhead just to the rear 
boundary of the operational area; the alternate land route through Southern Rhodesia to the railhead at 
Broken Hill was even longer at 970 kilometres to the frontier.  
To put these distances in context: British doctrine for a developed theatre foresaw the use of a 
railway line to move supplies from a base to a railhead where the supplies would be transferred to 
mechanical transport columns, which would then transport the loads to divisional refilling points a 
maximum of 72 kilometres distance. From the refilling points, divisional horse-drawn train transport 
would move the supplies a maximum of 24 kilometres to unit quartermasters’ stores where its first-line 
pack animal transport would make the final distribution to the forward troops. In terms of units, this 
meant that the lines of communication would provide a divisional motor transport (MT) column (45 
three-ton and 16 three-hundred weight lorries) to each unit which in turn would have four horse 
transport train companies (378 horses, 17 carts and 125 wagons) to support the artillery, and another 
three for its constituent brigades as well as ammunition columns for the artillery. Furthermore, this 
system envisaged the provision of the full panoply of rear services, including motor ambulance convoys, 
ambulance trains, clearing, stationary and general hospitals, ammunition and ordnance parks run by the 
Quartermaster General and Inspector General of Communications.32  As an independent force in a 
remote theatre, Norforce would have been entitled to a much greater slice than a normal brigade; the 
reality was that in late 1915, there were a total of three 8-ton lorries and no horse-drawn transport with 
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carriers doing the work in the forward zones. The challenges were clear: Northey would have to 
improvise a system to meet such exceptional challenges.33 
With the all-important base organisation sorted out, the state of the fighting troops now required 
his attention. Conducting a tour of the entire frontier between Lakes Nyasa and Tanganyika, in which he 
walked some 880 kilometres (and swam a number of rivers), Northey looked hard at his new 
command.34 The troops were willing, but there were weaknesses in unit leadership and training. Most 
worryingly, commanders showed little understanding of the realities of modern warfare with their tactics 
being thoroughly outdated. With only a small staff, Norforce’s commander had to devote much of 
March 1916 putting the defences in order and preparing for the advance with the building of roads and 
telegraphs to link his isolated garrisons. Considerable effort was also put into the education of his 
column commanders and the production of detailed tactical instructions. With his experience from the 
Western Front, Northey knew the importance of thoroughly and methodically preparing his force for 
battle.35 He issued comprehensive instructions and stressed proper preparation: 
Every little detail must be thought out beforehand; transport, supply, ammunition, bombs, 
entrenching tools … Remember that an accurately timed concentration from exterior points on to a 
central object is one of the most difficult in time of war, especially so in a closely intersected bush 
country.36 
He understood that in such a vast country with relatively small numbers of troops on both sides, 
columns would have to operate independently, often widely separated, and reliant on runners and on 
the few, bulky wireless sets to maintain contact with their commander. He also knew that mobility 
depended on having sufficient carriers to carry supplies forward, and he arranged for thousands to be 
recruited through the colonial governments in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia.37 Initiative and good 
judgment would be at a premium making it fortunate that he had two high-quality column commanders 
in the persons of Lieutenant Colonels (Lt. Cols.) GMP Hawthorn of 1st KAR and RE Murray of the 
British South Africa Police (BSAP), commanding in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia respectively; 
both of whom would play leading roles in the coming advance. There were also some less talented 
officers, but with few resources, Northey had to make the best possible use of the available manpower.  
All in all, Northey’s appointment would demand strong leadership, courage and a steady nerve 
together with a mastery of staff work, both operational and administrative, under the most difficult of 
physical conditions. It was a challenge that would make great demands of his force over the next two and 
a half years.  
 
5. The advance into German East Africa: May–August 1916 
General Smuts’ main advance had begun in March 1916, but as the rainy season finished later in the 
south, it was agreed that Norforce would begin its advance in late May. Apart from allowing the ground 
to dry out, it was hoped that the staggered start might also draw off German reserves to the north. 
Physically separated by hundreds of kilometres, communications between Smuts and Northey were 
limited to a circuitous telegraphic route with little prospect of direct discussions.  
The extra time was welcome as most of the fighting units were newly raised and all required 
additional training in modern warfare. They were drawn from very mixed backgrounds: at one level was 
the regular 1st KAR, followed by the paramilitary BSAP and NRP, veterans of the South-West Africa 
campaign in the 5th Mountain Battery, South African Mounted Rifles (SAMR), down to the newly 
recruited 1st and 2nd South African Rifles (SAR). Overall, there were about 2 400 effective rifles in the 
theatre, divided into four columns. Facing them, were an estimated 1 500 enemy rifles deployed along the 
frontier, with the bulk concentrated in Bismarckburg in the west and Neu Langenburg in the east. In fact, 
54 
 
   
the German numbers were considerably overestimated, with only 700 available and highly dispersed. 
They too, suffered from inadequate communications, lacking direct telegraphic links to the main body 
and were served by unimproved footpaths rather than roads.38  
General Northey set himself an ambitious plan, as he wanted to clear the northern border in a 
single stroke. He deployed the bulk of his strength in the east with three columns concentrated between 
Fife and Lake Nyasa, while his fourth column under Murray was far to the west around Abercorn. The 
plan was to advance rapidly and cut off the German line of forward posts, forcing them to surrender. 
This hinged upon moving rapidly and striking before the enemy could react. The extremely low density 
of troops and the considerable size of the area of operations offered great opportunity for manoeuvre, 
but would also require concentration at key points in order to avoid defeat in detail. Northey also had the 
advantage of command of Lake Nyasa, where, with the seven small steamers and several well-located 
ports, he could quickly move troops and supplies over a hundred kilometres in a couple of days.39 
Starting on 23 May, the advance into German East Africa began well. The independent columns 
quickly reached and encircled their objectives. Rather than directly assaulting the very strong defences, 
the besiegers moved to cut off any escape. However, these moves had been partially forestalled by the 
enemy commander’s decision to start withdrawing north. Northey and his troops were soon to learn the 
difficulty of preventing determined troops from exfiltrating through a loose cordon in densely vegetated 
country at night. Consequently, after suffering a number of casualties, the surrounded garrisons 
managed to break out, albeit in some disorder, and with the loss of much equipment and supplies. By 29 




Map 1: Operations in German East Africa (May–November 1916) 
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The leading columns had advanced up to 130 kilometres through difficult terrain and across 
swollen rivers in less than five days. With crossroads and district capital of Neu Langenburg now 
captured, Northey kept pushing his columns forward in an effort to cut the Germans off. In the west, the 
enemy near Bismarckburg remained encircled by Murray’s Rhodesian troops, only breaking out with 
considerable loss on 5 June. The Germans were in disarray and unable to offer an effective defence 
against the attackers; they also suffered heavily from desertions by both carriers and armed auxiliaries.  
On 10 June, Norforce was forced to pause, having advanced up to 240 kilometres in just more 
than a fortnight and with its two main groupings some 320 kilometres apart. Northey now turned his 
attention to the new lines of communication between Neu Langenburg and Mwaya, at the northern end 
of Lake Nyasa, so as to make best use of his steamer flotilla. He also ordered the improvement of the 
existing tracks as well as the laborious process of stockpiling supplies.41  
He had reason to be pleased, as the advance had secured the borders of Northern Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland from the threat of invasion while disrupting the enemy thoroughly. Casualties had been very 
light, numbering fewer than twenty, while the local African population was proving very helpful.42 On 
the other hand, Northey had not achieved the decisive results he had desired as both he and his troops 
grappled with the realities of bush fighting. Nevertheless, it was a most promising start and his troops 
had full confidence in him. 
 
6. The advance to Iringa: June to September 1916 
Although nominally independent, Northey always remained conscious of the need to support General 
Smuts’s main advance. As the main force neared the Central Railway, Smuts hoped to surround the 
Germans in the heart of their colony, ringed in by the Belgians and Norforce. He planned to send Van 
Deventer’s Second Division south from Kondoa Irangi towards the Great Ruaha River while bringing up 
Norforce to link up from the south to cut off the enemy Westtruppen who were being pushed east out of 
Ruanda and Urundi by the Belgians. To the south and east of Lake Tanganyika, the 480 kilometres to 
Bismarckburg was very sparsely populated and unlikely to support any sizeable German force. Together 
with the success of the British–Belgian naval flotilla in dominating the waters of Lake Tanganyika, the 
western flank was no longer a significant concern and Norforce could be concentrated for the drive on 
Iringa.  
The eastern flank was rather more challenging as the escarpment fell dramatically into the 
steamy lowlands of the Ulanga valley. Here, the thick bush and many watercourses presented 
obstacles to movement while the Schutztruppe maintained a number of weak detachments to protect 
the approaches to the important Mahenge plateau. More importantly, the British established supply 
depots at Iringa, Mahenge and Kissaki for the sustenance of troops south of the Central Railway.43 
Further to the south and east of Lake Nyasa, lay the Songea district, a fertile and valuable area rich in 
food that was virtually undefended. Northey had consistently, but unsuccessfully, tried to get the 
Portuguese to occupy this area to protect his right flank as well to deny it to the Germans. Northey 
rightly worried about the vulnerability of his small force, dependent as it was on long and exposed 
lines of communication. 
He was also personally keen to maintain the pressure, and agreed to move north in early June 
although the Second Division would be unable to start for at least three more weeks. His objective 
was Iringa, some 430 kilometres north of Neu Langenburg along the spur of the Utschungwe 
(Udzungwa) Mountains, which extend from Lake Nyasa in the south to Iringa, rising to a peak of 
2 579 metres.44 On 8 June, Murray was ordered to rejoin the main body from Bismarckburg by a 320-
kilometre march to Neu Langenburg, a journey that would take some three weeks.45  
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Smuts’ plan looked good on a map, but overlooked the reality that Iringa was 80 kilometres 
from the Great Ruaha River, which in turn lay some 120 kilometres from the Central Railway on 
which the Second Division would have to depend. Furthermore, it would not be easy to trap the 
Schutztruppe in such an area of thick vegetation and difficult terrain. Despite these concerns, Northey 
began planning for the move on Iringa using his headquarters at Neu Langenburg. From this hub, 
tracks radiated to Iringa, Mahenge and Songea, all key centres of population and agriculture.  
The Utschungwe range, especially around Iringa, was wild and thickly forested, connected by a 
few steep and winding tracks. The ground then fell off sharply at the escarpment near Lupembe where it 
dropped into the low-lying land of the Great Ruaha and Ulanga River basins that ultimately joined that 
of the Rufiji River further east. Along the north-eastern edge of Lake Nyasa were the Livingstone 
(Kipengere) Mountains that form part of the escarpment of the East African Rift, extending about 
100 kilometres down the north-eastern shore to the Ruhuju River. Owing to this combination of broad, 
flat valleys surrounded by steep mountains and massifs, flooding was extensive during the rains. This 
meant that the Rufiji River could expand from a width of 400 metres in the dry season to nearly 10 
kilometres between banks during the wet season. The Great Ruaha and Ulanga Rivers were not as 
dramatic, but the flooding was still very extensive. There were no roads with only footpaths leading 
from village to village. The numerous rivers and streams were surrounded by dense jungle, high grass 
and swamp. These lowlands were hot, humid and pestilential with vast numbers of malarial mosquitoes 
and other pests that made life a misery and spread the many prevalent tropical diseases.  
By contrast, the German-held Mahenge Plateau that rose above the Ulanga and Rufiji Rivers was 
fertile with a relatively healthy climate and substantial population. An attractive objective, Mahenge was 
protected by the surrounding humid forest and difficult tracks that led through the lowlands. Further to 
the south-west was the district of Songea, which was better drained and equally fertile. It had the 
advantage of being much more easily accessible, as vessels on Lake Nyasa could easily steam from 
Mwaya down to the small port of Wiedhafen (Manda) before marching inland.46 
Overall, the climate in the highlands was wet, although much cooler and less trying than the torrid 
lowlands. Neither area was, however, heavily populated nor developed. Supplying a large force would be 
almost impossible under the existing conditions, and improvements were essential. Northey now turned 
to his sole squadron of SA Engineers, who numbered barely 50 sappers, to begin a major road-building 
programme. They were assisted by large numbers of local African labourers who did much of the 
physical labour of hacking out routes. Equally important was the expansion of the transport service 
needed to move supplies forward to the troops. Although there were a few motor vehicles available, 
these had only limited utility in the forward areas, and the vast majority of loads were carried on the 
heads of African carriers. If this was one of the least efficient methods of transport, it was essential in 
the absence of railways or motor vehicles, themselves in their infancy. This, plus the enormous distances 
involved, meant that vast numbers of civilians were required to support the columns. 
Colonel Hawthorn with 1st KAR cleared the area around Neu Langenburg, occupying the key 
crossroads at Ubena (Njombe) on 18 June while another column secured Brandt, seizing tons of supplies. 
The SA Engineers had extended the new motor road from Mwaya to Neu Langenburg to Brandt, enabling 
the vastly more efficient motor vehicles to relieve the porters who in turn could move forward with the 
marching columns. The extra supply capacity also meant that Murray’s BSAP column could be sustained 
in the forward area as it duly arrived at the end of June.47 Now, with reports of the German 
reinforcements arriving from the north, Northey could prepare his force for the next stage of operations.  
On the German side, Col. Lettow was concerned about the threat posed by Norforce’s advance 
towards the southern granary of the colony. Unwilling to sacrifice most of the wheat crop, he ordered 
substantial reinforcements in late June to march south from the Central Railway and Iringa to hold the 
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general arc Madibira–Malangali. These villages were about 70 kilometres apart, both being about 240 
kilometres north-east of Neu Langenburg, and lie astride the route to Iringa. With more than 800 
additional rifles on the march, the local Schutztruppe would soon pose a serious threat to Norforce.48   
By mid-July, Northey estimated that there were now more than 1 100 Germans entrenched to the 
north of his force. A new danger now emerged from the east in the form of Abt. Kraut appearing at 
Lupembe. With his right flank at Ubena threatened, Headquarters (HQ) Norforce ordered Hawthorn’s 1st 
KAR to deal with Kraut. But, despite his repeated entreaties, Northey was deeply disappointed by the 
failure of his Portuguese allies to send troops to the Songea area, which was only lightly held.49 The 
detachment of 1st KAR now meant that there were only about 1 000 rifles available for the planned move 
on Iringa. 
It was not until the third week of July that Norforce was again ready to attack to the north. As there 
were nearly 900 enemy troops holding Malangali, Northey decided to use the bulk of his troops to attack 
there, leaving Murray with a small covering force at Madibira. A concentric advance succeeded in 
dislodging the defenders at heavy cost while the British had 80 casualties, the bulk of whom were lightly 
wounded. It was an important victory, as it forced the evacuation of Madibira and the Germans retired 
north along the Iringa road.50 
Unfortunately, this success was not matched by similar progress in the north as the weakened 
Second Division was only now just beginning to advance from Kondoa Irangi while the main body was 
halted further east on the Lukigura River suffering badly from inadequate supplies. The planned link-up 
between Smuts and Northey was still far from being effected, and Norforce was becoming increasingly 
exposed from both the German forces in the far west being pushed eastwards by the Belgians and the 
smaller force at Lupembe. Some reinforcements in the form of recruits for 1st KAR and the recently 
raised 1st Rhodesian Native Regiment (1st RNR) were on their way, but they were barely trained and 
unready for use.51 
By the beginning of August, and despite repeated assurances, it was also clear that no reliance 
could be placed on the Portuguese securing Songea. With orders to hold firm for the moment, Northey 
decided to send Hawthorn’s column to deal with the enemy around Lupembe, while leaving Murray 
and Lt. Col. Rodger of 2nd SAR to hold in the north. This move soon had the desired effect, and 
Norforce could resume its drive north.52  
In the meanwhile, Second Division had reached Kilossa on the Central Railway and a link-up 
again appeared possible. Columns under Cols. Murray and Rodger were now instructed to push north 
towards Iringa. Resistance was light with the Germans conducting a delaying action and avoiding 
decisive action. By 29 August, the highlands were clear and Iringa was occupied. It was another 
remarkable advance in difficult conditions and on the very limits of supply. Nevertheless, a gap of 
nearly 160 kilometres of dense jungle remained between the two forces. 
On the other hand, it left Northey’s troops in a very exposed position as they were dependent on a 
fragile line of communication of more than 320 kilometres and with no flank protection. Apart from 
Kraut in the east, a much more worrying development was the withdrawal of the substantial German 
forces under Gen. Wahle from Tabora. It was likely that they would attempt to march on Mahenge in 
order to rejoin the main body of the Schutztruppe. Such a move would pose a major threat to Northey, 
especially as his forward bases at Ubena and Buhora were virtually unprotected. He simply lacked the 
troops to be strong everywhere.  
Smuts was less concerned and wanted Norforce to seize Mahenge, another 160 kilometres to 
the east of Iringa. Northey had considered this previously, but had rejected the idea as too risky as he 
was concerned about being cut off and urged that the Second Division move to Iringa to enable him to 
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concentrate his scattered troops53  The short rainy season was due to start anytime and this would 
further complicate supply matters.54 Smuts ignored these blandishments, and in early September gave 
orders for the advance. These were soon followed with instructions to occupy the rich Songea district. 
Northey had no choice but to commit his only reserve, the newly raised 1st RNR, under Lt. Col. 
Tomlinson. Half the battalion sailed by steamer to Wiedhafen in mid-month, reaching Songea on 20 
September.55 Norforce was now truly over-extended with Roger and Murray around Iringa, Hawthorn 
at Lupembe and a third force at Songea. It now numbered about 4 700 of all ranks, of whom about 
3 700 were fighting troops. The lines of communication remained paramount as Hawthorn at 
Lupembe had to be supported over a distance of more than 320 kilometres of difficult mountain, 
forest and lowland valley back to the main body which was another 288 kilometres back to Mwaya on 
Lake Nyasa. Songea was relatively easy as supplies could move by steamers to Wiedhafen, but there 
remained some 119 kilometres to move overland.56  
Concurrent with the occupation of Songea, Hawthorn moved forward to Mkapira on the 
Ruhudje River where he successfully engaged Abt Kraut. Murray then marched south to join him at 
the end of September where both prepared for the planned advance.57 If Norforce was ready, then 
Second Division was manifestly not, and the offensive had to be postponed indefinitely. Instead, the 
columns prudently prepared defences and built up food stocks, ready for any counter-attack.58 Now 
deploying nearly 4 000 rifles in three detachments separated by wild and mountainous terrain, Northey 
was growing increasingly nervous about the progress of Wahle’s troops. They had disappeared from 
view south of Tabora on 19 September and were believed to have 1 500 rifles (in fact they had 2 500). 
Together with Kraut’s 2 400 rifles in the east, the Germans posed a grave danger to Norforce. Despite 
the seriousness of the situation, the Second Division could only despatch an understrength mounted 
squadron to the Great Ruaha River, which was still 115 kilometres north of Iringa.59  
Wahle’s troops appeared near Iringa on 12 October and began building up for an attack.60 The 
Second Division ordered a weak battalion south, but with Hawthorn and Murray faced by a strong force 
under Kraut, they could not come to Rodger’s assistance.61 The lines of communication had only tiny 
garrisons at the major depots and Northey now committed his only reserve, the remaining half of 1st 
RNR, to his transport base at Buhora and waited.62 The cutting of telegraph wires to Iringa soon deprived 
him of personal influence on the coming battle.  
By 22 October, Wahle was ready to attack the beleaguered garrison of Iringa while Kraut had 
begun to surround Hawthorn and Murray in the south.63 The situation appeared bleak and was saved by 
the arrival of a weakened SA infantry battalion from the north. However, it was just sufficient to disrupt 
Wahle’s attack and to persuade him to move south against easier targets.64 For their part, Hawthorn and 
Murray were well dug-in and had accumulated sufficient food for a determined stand.65 
Thwarted at Iringa, Wahle overran the supply depot at Ngominyi on 28 October before moving on 
to the major base at Malangali.66 Northey made use of his wireless transmitter to inform Hawthorn and 
Murray of the desperate situation. That night, they launched a surprise attack that drove Kraut back across 
the river with heavy losses. Now free to move, Northey ordered Murray to march back to deal with 
Wahle.67 At long last, the bedraggled Second Division was able to move to Iringa, taking command on 30 
October, and relieving Norforce of a major burden.68 
Wahle’s leading troops reached Malangali on 8 November. Apart from its vital supply dumps, its 
loss would also leave Buhora, with the bulk of Norforce’s vehicle transport fleet, at great risk. With the 
defenders greatly outnumbered, Northey decided to make a daring counter-move. He used 50 of his 
scarce light cars to carry half of Murray’s troops to relieve the besieged depot, making good use of his 
road network. It was a gamble, but the 304-kilometre road move was a success as his arrival induced 
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Wahle to break off the attack. On the night of 11/12 November, Murray completed his mission by 
completely overwhelming the German rearguard.69  
Wahle now moved on towards Lupembe, but Norforce had regained its balance. Murray’s 
Rhodesians re-embarked in vehicles and returned to secure the vital crossroads at Ubena, while Murray 
ordered Hawthorn to march back on Lupembe.70 Then both columns converged on the besiegers and 
broke the encirclement. By 15 November, Wahle’s troops had disappeared to the east where they joined 
up with Kraut in the Ulanga valley. Once again, Northey had used his resources to excellent effect as his 
engineers continued to make new roads to head off the enemy, and he used his vehicles to move 200 or 
300 men on a regular basis.71  
However, the battle was not quite finished, as Songea was next to face attack by the Germans on 
12 November. The raw half-battalion of 1st RNR held it off, inflicting heavy casualties on the attackers 
who then withdrew eastwards to Likuju.72 At the same time, one of Wahle’s columns had become 
separated and had straggled badly behind the main body. Nearly 300 strong and armed with a howitzer, 
these troops halted at Ilembule on 20 November, unaware of the location of the main body. Once again, 
Northey used his wireless communications and superior mobility to deal with the threat. Murray’s 
column moved out in vehicles, surrounding the detachment and cutting them off from water. Within a 
few days, they were forced to surrender. With this capitulation, the threat from the west had completely 
passed.73 
The fighting also obscured an important change to Norforce’s status. On 14 November, it was 
removed from Colonial Office control and formally subordinated to the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C), 
East African Force. Although this was a nominal loss of independence, in practice it meant little change 
as Northey had always acted as though he was under General Smuts’s orders. Equally, he retained full 
responsibility for running his own supply and administration.74 
The threat to Norforce had been very real, and Wahle missed a chance to destroy his opponent’s 
exposed lines of communication or even headquarters. Northey’s exposure was partially due to his risk 
taking, but also to Smuts’s lack of understanding of the threat. Nevertheless, Northey had recovered well 
and his tactics, helped by dynamic column commanders, had ensured that a potentially dangerous blow 
was successfully parried. His attention to his lines of communication had also paid off tactically, as it 
enabled him to risk his small fleet of motor vehicles in a bold counter-move. Having inflicted more than 
500 casualties onto an enemy possessing the advantages of concentration and tactical freedom, Northey 
had salvaged a minor victory out of likely defeat.75 
Nevertheless, the arrival of Wahle’s troops more than doubled the size of the Schutztruppe in the 
region. That officer now took command of the troops west of Mahenge, while a considerable detachment 
under Kraut remained near the eastern edge of the escarpment with another under Wintgens further to the 
east at Gumbiro. The rains were wreaking havoc on the lines of communication as rivers flooded and 
roads dissolved into mud. Both sides were now worn out after the exertions of the past six months and 
needed time in which to gather supplies and rest the troops.76 An operational pause ensued and 
reorganisation was set in train. But the results of the advance had not gone unnoticed in South Africa: 
Northeys [sic] success is very cheering … He has indeed done good work with his small force, and 
difficult communications, and if we had sent him a larger number of our own natives it would go 
hard, but he would finish the lot off.77 
Smuts’s troops further north were in terrible condition, suffering heavily from underfeeding, over-
exertion and malaria. His nominal divisions were in fact individually weaker than Northey’s 5 000 rifles 
and unfit for further offensive operations.78 For its part, Norforce was also suffering heavily from sickness 
although it never lost its cohesion and effectiveness owing to strong leadership and good organisation. 
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These qualities would soon be required again for a renewed offensive. By 13 December, Northey 
estimated that only 72 kilometres out of the 560 kilometres of motor roads were usable. This meant 
that all supplies now had to be carried laboriously by porter from Lake Nyasa over the Livingstone 
Mountains before going forward.79  
General Smuts was never less than ambitious in his planning. Anxious to wrap up the campaign, 
he planned a renewed general advance for late December 1916. In the east, his troops would push west 
and south towards the Rufiji River while the Second Division would move in from the west. For its part, 
Norforce was to clear the Iringa highlands of the enemy before moving east towards Mahenge. It was a 
grand plan that rested more on hope than on sound planning, but Northey was a dependable subordinate 
who could be relied upon.   
Norforce began its advance against Kraut’s troops on 24 December only the next day to find the 
position evacuated. Despite supply problems, the troops pushed on and by 9 January 1917, the 
escarpment was clear with Kraut well to the south. Northey shifted Murray’s column in pursuit, while 
Hawthorn cleared to the Ruhudje River, which now was beginning to flood. Kraut was now trying to 
move south towards Songea, which was being reinforced by Major (Maj.) Grawert.80 On 19 January, the 
British moved first and surrounded Grawert’s troops near Songea. Cut-off and out of food Grawert 
surrendered on 22 January with more than 230 soldiers and a field gun. This was another notable success 
and relieved the pressure on Songea. The rain continued to fall and by the end of the month, the rising 
rivers forced Northey to pull back from the Ruhudje valley and onto the high ground.81 It was an 
excellent achievement as Norforce had fully carried out its orders to drive the enemy into the unhealthy 
lowlands while capturing another entire detachment intact. The full onset of the main rainy season made 
campaigning even more difficult than hitherto as both sides had to contend with severe supply problems 
and just trying to remain alive. Norforce was widely stretched over a vast area of country; the distance 
from his headquarters in Ubena to the forward troops was 208 kilometres with columns split between 
Likuju, Songea, Kitanda, Alt-Langenburg and Lupembe. Northey remained dissatisfied with the situation 
around Songea and at the end of January, he decided to send Hawthorn to take charge there. 
Concurrently, 1st KAR split itself into two battalions with 1/1st KAR staying put and 2/1st being sent south 
with Hawthorn.82  
Norforce’s superior preparations had enabled it to withstand the effects of the climate better 
than the main force under Smuts, but sickness continued to take its toll. After the long advance to 
Iringa and the subsequent fight against Wahle’s troops, Norforce needed a rest as the lines of 
communication were disintegrating in the mud. As the month progressed, the rains became 
increasingly heavy and the broad lowlands east of the escarpment continued to flood. Although on 
higher and healthier ground than Hoskins’s main body, the troops of Norforce were still suffering 
from the cold, damp climate and disease. Numbers had been reduced to less than half the normal 
strength, and the SA units were particularly hard hit by sickness.83 However, unexpected events would 
soon deprive it of any respite. 
  
7. The Wintgens raid 
The troops commanded by Kraut and Wintgens remained the main worry for Norforce as both were 
energetic and dependable commanders, but were suffering acutely from a lack of food and were 
constantly foraging for enough supplies to survive.84 Equally, Northey had only a limited number of 
troops spread over enormous distances. This meant that he could only defend discreet points rather 
than a continuous line. He was well aware of the impossibility of preventing a breakthrough, but 
could do little but remain vigilant. By mid-February, his worst fears were realised when Abt. 
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Wintgens, with about 550 rifles, made such a break to the north-west. It knifed through the tenuous 
lines of communication near Gumbiro, overrunning a supply post and threatening both Alt-
Langenburg and Ubena. Northey immediately despatched 1st RNR in pursuit and brought back 
Murray’s column, now reinforced by 1/1st KAR, from the forward areas to support them.85 
It was a timely move, as Murray arrived just in time to disrupt Wintgens’s plans for an attack. 
Now seriously threatened, the Germans turned north-west heading for Lake Rukwa, using their head 
start and superior mobility to break away. Murray had to pause briefly and then followed on, 
supported by one of Northey’s scarce aircraft. Much hard marching followed as they tried to pick up 
their opponent’s trail although they were aided by aerial reconnaissance. Physical contact between the 
columns was not restored until 11 March as Wintgens headed for St Moritz.86 En-route, his Abteilung. 
trapped the RNR column and Murray was diverted to their rescue from his task of cutting off the 
enemy’s line of retreat. This was successful but Murray’s troops they lost valuable time that enabled 
the Germans to escape.87 The Schutztruppe made pursuit more difficult by stripping the countryside 
bare of food, forcing Murray to bring his supplies forward by carriers. Murray remained in hot 
pursuit, heading for St Moritz where he believed that Wintgens was trapped behind two swollen 
rivers. After a number of encounters, the Germans reached their objective on 26 March, and began to 
build improvised rafts.88 
In the south, Kraut was also causing problems for Northey as the former’s Abteilung moved 
against the vulnerable Wiedhafen–Songea area. Now it was Col. Hawthorn’s turn to pursue the highly 
mobile enemy and he did so vigorously with 2/1st KAR. Abt. Kraut was hit repeatedly, but was able to 
break contact and head for the Portuguese border. On 24 February, Hawthorn was recalled to Songea to 
be ready to deal with another enemy force, under Captain (Capt.) Lincke, assembling at Likuju, some 80 
kilometres north-east. Once again, the lighter German columns, living off the land like locusts, were able 
to outstrip their British counterparts, who were dependent on lengthening lines of communication. 
Kraut’s force was still on the move and unlocated, but it was presumed to be heading south of the 
Rovuma.89  
March saw some welcome developments for Northey as he received the newly raised 1/4th KAR 
from Hoskins as well as the news that another battalion of Cape Coloured (mixed race) men (2nd Cape 
Corps) and two of Rhodesians were being raised for him.90 Hawthorn spent some time reconnoitring the 
difficult terrain in the Likuju area and driving back enemy outposts. Murray continued doggedly on 
Wintgens’ tail, hitting his rearguards repeatedly, but unable to outpace the main force. Northey kept a 
close watch on matters: 
I have impressed upon Col. Murray the importance of concentrating towards WINTGENS and not 
allowing WINTGENS to beat him in detail: also to close round so that WINTGENS cannot easily 
collect food.91  
If Wintgens remained elusive, Hawthorn’s efforts had forced Abt. Kraut to retire in a battered condition 
to Tunduru for recuperation. Equally worrying was the state of the troops’ health, particularly the white 
South Africans. Both 1st and 2nd SAR were nearly totally unfit for offensive operations while their morale 
was dented by having to carry on campaigning while the majority of SA units in the north were being 
sent home.92 
It was clear that, despite Murray’s valiant efforts, reinforcements were required. By the end of 
March, Gen. Hoskins had dispatched extra troops towards Bismarckburg and Tabora while asking for 
Belgian assistance.93 But the strain on Norforce was almost unbearable with its HQ in Ubena and 
columns scattered from south of Tabora to Iringa to Songea, the bulk of the 725 kilometres being 
complete wilderness. Northey noted: 
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I do not think that anyone who does not know CENTRAL AFRICA, with all its difficulties of 
supply and transport, torrential rains at this Season of the year, mountain passes, flooded rivers, 
and swamps, can appreciate how extraordinarily quickly MURRAY’S Column has moved under 
the circumstances, from 150 miles [240 kilometres] East of the North end of LAKE NYASA to 
100 miles [160 kilometres] North-west of same.94 
This dissipation of strength placed enormous pressure on Northey’s small and overworked supply staff, 
which also had to make preparations for the forthcoming dry season offensive. The loss of Murray’s 
column had reduced Norforce by more than three battalions, but Abt Kraut still posed a threat further to 
the south either around Songea or in Portuguese East Africa.95 It was a distinctly undesirable position, but 
in the circumstances, there was little choice.  
April was largely taken up with the continued pursuit of Wintgens at ever-increasing distance from 
Norforce’s supply bases. Hawthorn’s column left the Songea area to deal with Lincke, reaching the 
flooded Likuju River on 7 April. After a number of inconclusive skirmishes, he managed to cross the 
river and move on to the camp at Likuju, occupying it without opposition on 27 April, with Abt Lincke 
having evacuated to the east.96 
If this assured the security of Songea, a new threat was arising. Patrols and captured dispatches 
made it clear that elements of Abt Kraut, under the command of Major (Maj.) von Stuemer, were 
marching south into Portuguese territory. This was confirmed on 27 April when they occupied 
Mwembe, some 190 kilometres north-east of Fort Johnston.97 This move posed a distinct danger as 
there was little to stop Stuemer from continuing on through Portuguese East Africa and on to the 
Zambezi River. This could potentially sever Norforce’s vulnerable lines of communication while little 
assistance could be expected from the poorly trained Portuguese forces. Northey had little choice, but 
to send his last reserve, the recently formed and barely trained 5th South African Infantry (5th SAI) to 
Fort Johnston. These troops had been suffering heavily from illness, but there was no other option to 
plug the gap.98 
Murray, delayed by supply problems and a lack of carriers, was south of Kitunda on 3 May, just 
as the enemy completed his escape.99 With wet ground and swollen rivers delaying his food convoys, 
the follow-up north was again broken as his column could not close the gap. However, help was on 
the way, for the Belgians took over responsibility for Bismarckburg and Tabora while British 
reinforcements moved up the Central Railway.100 
In the south, Stuemer’s raid was causing increasing worry as it was attracting significant local 
African support. On 6 May, Northey ordered the newly arrived 1/4th KAR from Ubena to Fort 
Johnston while 1/1st KAR was detached from Murray to act as a local reserve from Ubena. At the 
same time, Northey shifted his HQ from Ubena back to Zomba in Nyasaland in order to be near the 
greatest threat.101  
These re-deployments were extremely timely as the troops arrived at their forward border posts 
just before the Germans got there. With the main route between Portuguese East Africa and 
Nyasaland firmly guarded and both sides roughly equivalent in numbers, the situation quieted down 
as each settled into new positions.102 Northey reached Zomba on 14 May as his reinforcements began 
to arrive. With the coming of the rains to Songea, he decided to shift his main effort to Nyasaland and 
ordered Col. Hawthorn to take local command there.103 With an increasing enemy presence in 
Portuguese territory, it was a timely move as the promised Portuguese reinforcements only reached 
the seaport of Chinde on 25 May. These were diverted to the protection of the lines of communication 
leading up to Nyasaland and were kept away from the scene of active fighting. This provided much-
needed protection of each force’s supply lines and, as the British desired, kept the two armies 
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separated. In any event, with the Portuguese embroiled in the suppression of the revolt further south in 
Tete and Barue, they could do little more.104 
In the west, Wintgens had become critically ill and had turned over command to Lt. Naumann 
on 21 May. Although Murray was still pressing hard from the south, he was plagued with ever-longer 
supply lines and a lack of carriers. Finally, with the Belgians now fully involved in the pursuit, 
Murray was ordered to rejoin Norforce on 28 May. Although he had been unable to stop the wily 
Wintgens, his troops had made an outstanding effort that earned the justified tribute of Gen. 
Hoskins.105 Murray’s force, only 80 kilometres south of the Central Railway, now began the long 
march south, reaching the Ubena area on 15 June where they were given a week’s rest before moving 
on to Mwaya on Lake Nyasa for the coming offensive. The break was well earned as the men had 
been on the march continuously on short rations and few comforts since February.106  
On 25 May, the remaining half of 1/4th KAR arrived at Fort Johnston, giving Northey local 
numerical superiority. This enabled him to order patrols into Mtonia the next day, and to capture it on 
1 June. The Germans appeared to be thinning out and it was decided to reinforce the advantage south 
of Lake Nyasa. On 3 June, Northey moved 1/4th KAR forward to support the South Africans, while 
withdrawing the details of semi-trained KAR soldiers back to Zomba where they resumed the vital 
task of preparing for the forthcoming operations.107 With the immediate threat having been averted, 
Northey resolved to drive the Germans out of Portuguese territory and north of the Rovuma into the 
developing envelopment being led by the main forces.108  
By early June, Norforce was widely stretched over a vast area of country; the distance from his HQ 
in Ubena to the forward troops was 210 kilometres alone, with columns in Likuju, Songea, Kitanda, Alt-
Langenburg and Lupembe.109 They were faced by three major groupings with Abt. von Langenn opposite 
Lupembe, Abt. Lincke near Likuju, and Abt. von Stuemer near Fort Johnston. Additionally, Wahle 
maintained control over a substantial number of troops based at Mahenge that could easily enter the fray. 
It was a far from enviable position. 
 
8. The push into German East Africa: June–November 1917 
General Northey considered that the German main body would only move into Portuguese East Africa 
if pushed there, and, until the situation east of Mahenge had been cleared up, there was the potential 
for another raiding force to break westward. He proposed converging simultaneous thrusts against the 
enemy, but, conscious of the time needed to get Murray’s column back and suitably rested, Northey 
expected that the former’s advance would start after the others. The new C-in-C, Gen. Van Deventer, 
agreed, realising the importance of having Northey attack Mpepo and Mtarika as it would draw off 
enemy forces on the Ruipa line prior to the arrival of the Belgians. Once the latter were ready, 
Northey could then shorten his line by giving them responsibility for the Ruhudje sector. By that 
stage, Murray’s column would be able to participate in the general offensive.110 
This would leave the Songea column at about 1 000 rifles with 16 machine guns and two 
mountain guns, and the Fort Johnston column with a similar number, both ready to start at the end of 
June with Murray’s column preparing until 7 July. This would provide another 1 000 rifles, giving 
Northey more than 3 000 men advancing on two axes.  The Norforce commander also noted that an 
additional two battalions’ worth of reinforcements would be arriving in July, but neither would be 
ready for the field before August.111 Likuju would also form an important staging base, as both a 




   
 
Map 2: Operations in German East Africa (June–September 1917) 
 
Norforce used most of June to prepare itself for the arduous moves ahead. Col. Murray’s 
column had completed its epic march, reaching Wiedhafen on 25 June. Murray then moved up to 
Songea where he assumed command of the reserve force there, reinforced by 1st RNR. Furthermore, 
with 1st and 2nd SAR almost ineffective due to sickness, Northey disbanded them and converted the 
remaining personnel into Lewis gunners. They were then distributed amongst the new African 
battalions to provide additional firepower and experience. With the return of Murray’s troops, 
Norforce was stronger than before, but the advancing columns were hardly overwhelming. The Likuju 
column under Col. Stevens, based on 2/1st KAR, had about 900 rifles, compared to Abt. Lincke’s 600, 
while Carbutt’s 650 men of the 1st RNR faced 350 of Abt. Aumann at Mpepo and Shorthose’s 700 
rifles of 1/4th KAR were ranged against the 400 of Abt. von Stuemer.112 
In the centre, Stevens’ preparations were nearly upset by the enemy. Abt. Lincke, with four 
companies and a battery near Likuju, was unaware of the scale of the British build-up. Ordered to 
attack the British camp, on 28 June, Lincke launched a strong assault that surprised Stevens. The 
defenders held their ground and the Germans broke off the attack just in time to escape encirclement 
from two nearby British columns that were preparing for their own advance. Once the danger was 
over, Norforce’s leading elements converged on Likuju for rest and final preparations.113 
While these preparations were underway, Tafel, now in command at Mahenge, had major 
problems to overcome. His troops were necessarily dispersed owing to a lack of food, and the passage 
of orders was correspondingly slow and cumbersome. He faced a growing threat from the Belgians in 
the north-west and Norforce in the west.114 Despite expecting a fresh offensive, Tafel could not 
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concentrate his troops until the last minute and was heavily reliant on the initiative of his detachment 
commanders who were of variable quality. 
Norforce began its advance on 2 July with the aim of locating and destroying Abt. Lincke. It 
was located the next day, some 23 kilometres from Likuju at the important track junction linking 
Songea–Liwale and Songea–Mahenge. 1/1st KAR was ordered to attack, while the remainder of 
Murray’s Rhodesians finally arrived at Songea after their arduous return march. The enveloping move 
took a few days to develop as the deep ravines and densely vegetated valleys were difficult to 
negotiate. Finally, with the encirclement complete on the night of 6/7 July, the Germans hastily 
evacuated their very strong position, leaving behind a considerable quantity of equipment. Escaping, 
with a number of casualties, they made good use of darkness and some newly cut bush paths. Lincke 
himself was evacuated, sick, to Mahenge and command devolved to Capt. Poppe.115  
The advance continued, although Abt. Poppe moved unexpectedly north rather than towards 
Liwale as it was short of food, using delaying tactics, so as not to become decisively engaged. 
Equally, Norforce’s leading troops were beginning to outpace the supply columns, as previously 
ordered motor vehicles had still not arrived. In the meantime, much further south, Shorthose’s 1/4th 
KAR was closing in on Mwembe, some 240 kilometres north-west of Fort Johnston, preparing to 
attack Abt. von Stuemer there. After ambushing a German patrol on 5 July, the battalion attacked 
Mwembe the next day and drove out the defenders. 116 
On his northern flank, the small force of about 650 under Col. Carbutt was preparing to move 
on Mpepo against Abt. Aumann which was estimated to have 350 rifles and five machine guns. This 
move was intended to draw off any German reinforcements for Mahenge and thereby assist the 
Belgian advance further north from Iringa. Norforce also made maximum use of the slender air 
resources available. With one aircraft based at Likuju and another pushed forward to Mwembe, they 
were constantly engaged in reconnoitring and bombing enemy positions. Supply dumps, usually based 
in highly flammable grass huts, were a favoured target and several small successes were achieved. 
With the advance going well, Northey convinced Van Deventer that he should abandon the advance 
on Liwale in favour of following the enemy to Mpondas, so as to concentrate on destroying the enemy 
rather than seizing ground. Although the Belgian build-up was going slowly, Northey’s request to 
continue the simultaneous drives against Abt. Aumann in the north and Abt. von Stuemer in the south 
were approved.117 
By the middle of the month, Norforce was fully engaged in all three areas, pushing back the 
various enemy detachments. On 15 July, the welcome news of the arrival of the first Belgian 
contingent at Iringa was received, although tempered ten days later by learning that the Belgians 
would not take over the Lupembe–Mpepo sector as previously agreed. As recompense, Van Deventer 
promised to send 2/4th KAR from Iringa to Northey although this was little comfort to the thinly 
stretched Norforce. Further to the north. the column of NRP and 1st RNR, now commanded by Lt Col. 
Fair, had forced back Abt. Aumann between Mpepo and Mkapira on the right bank of the River 
Ruhudje by 26 July, but lacked the strength for an all-out attack.118 
At the beginning of August, Gen. Northey remained highly concerned about the dispersion of 
his force which, despite having nearly 4 000 effectives, was split into five columns over a front of 480 
kilometres. This, and the need to cover Mpepo, meant that he was unable to concentrate on Tunduru 
in the south. In the north, Fair’s troops had invested Abt. Aumann at Mpepo, followed by heavy, but 
indecisive fighting. The main column under Stevens had advanced steadily and fought a number of 
minor, but time-consuming, rearguard actions to bring it within five kilometres from Mpondas, where 
Abt. Lincke was heavily fortified. More positively, Shorthose’s column was making excellent progress 
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against Abt. von Stuemer.119 Van Deventer advised caution, and wanted Northey to hold Shorthose on 
the Rovuma River; Northey disagreed, noting: 
The Chief’s orders to me are to deny the rich TUNDURU district to the enemy, this can only be 
done by driving the enemy out of it and occupying it ourselves; if we are to take no risks we shall 
never finish this campaign. Chief telegraphs agreeing.120 
Unhappy with events, Northey arranged for a meeting with Sheppard, Van Deventer’s Chief of 
General Staff (CGS), on 16 August in order to discuss future plans face to face. There, they resolved a 
number of issues and agreed that a rapid advance by Hanforce and Linforce from the east would be 
necessary to end the campaign. In the meantime, the resolution of the crisis in Nyasaland enabled Col. 
Hawthorn to assume command of the column opposite Lincke. Elsewhere, the tactical situation was 
improving, as Shorthose had cleared almost 400 kilometres of Portuguese territory, having out-
manoeuvred his opponent, crossing the rapidly flowing and crocodile-infested Rovuma without boats 
by improvising rafts and ropes out of tree bark and grass. Finally, Northey held Murray’s column in 
reserve, securing the lines of communication, as he could not supply them moving  Tunduru. He also 
retained three battalions in Nyasaland partly for security, but mainly to continue their training, which 
was still not highly advanced. Norforce continued to construct motor roads, of which a total of 2 400 








   
Both Lincke and Aumann launched counter-attacks at Mpondas and Mpepo respectively on 22 
August. They were easily held off, but it was apparent that the stubborn resistance there was being 
used to cover the withdrawal of the forces north of Mahenge. Northey was now instructed to attack 
both places until they had fallen, while also denying the enemy the Tunduru district and preventing 
any attempted re-entry into Portuguese East Africa. Shorthose duly took Tunduru in a daring move 
the next day while Fair continued to tighten the encirclement at Mpepo. Aumann decided to evacuate 
during the night of 27/28 August, but a hot pursuit followed in which the Germans suffered heavily, 
with nearly a third of their force as casualties. By the end of the month, Norforce had inflicted 
significant losses on the Westtruppen, with 22 Germans and 241 Askaris being confirmed casualties 
and three guns taken.122 August had brought success at relatively low cost.  
With a resumption of the general advance planned for the third week in September, Norforce 
continued its pressure on the Germans with the advance continuing slowly in the difficult and broken 
terrain. Hawthorn forced Otto, who had replaced Lincke out of Mpondas, while Fair maintained his 
pursuit of Abt. Aumann.123 Aerial reconnaissance and bombing were used to good effect, and caused 
some disruption to the supply system of the enemy. The Belgian advance on Mahenge was now 
telling and Northey drove his troops as fast as they could manage. Throughout the month, the 
Germans launched a number of sharp counter-attacks against the various columns, but all were driven 
off without difficulty or heavy loss. Despite the apparent superiority of the situation, Northey was 
aware of the real problems: 
It will be our utmost endeavour to prevent them – but the distances are so great, the country so 
hilly and broken, and so full of deep ravines and dense jungle, that it is next to impossible to stop 
their escape if they choose to avoid fighting.124 
With the Belgians closing on Mahenge from the north and east, Fair was some 40 kilometres 
south-west and Hawthorn 80 kilometres south of that place, the ring was closing on Tafel who still 
had more than 1 500 rifles available. Murray remained in reserve, securing Hawthorn’s 
communications, while Shorthose held Tunduru with a further four new KAR battalions training in 
the rear areas. As ever, supply remained critical with all of the forward columns at their maximum 
limit of radius, namely 400 to 480 kilometres by road from Lake Nyasa and 1 370 kilometres from the 
sea base at Chinde. Now employing more than 6 000 soldiers and 30 000 African carriers, Northey 
remained acutely conscious of his administrative responsibilities and limitations.125 
As his fighting troops pushed on, the SA Engineers were hard at work improving the road 
network. They had cut a motor road from Wiedhafen to as far as Likuju and were in the process of 
extending it to Mpondas. This was important as it was now clear that Tafel was withdrawing from 
Mahenge and heading south-eastwards towards Liwale.126 Abt. Otto was critical to this move and held 
on determinedly against Hawthorn’s best efforts. The country was some of the worst experienced in 
the campaign and ideally suited to defensive operations. Then Van Deventer changed his priorities, 
ordering Northey to reinforce Hawthorn in an attempt to clear the Mahenge area of the enemy. This 
meant a further delay and it was not until 19 October that the attack was ready, by which time Otto 
had withdrawn. For his part, Fair continued the pressure on Abt. Aumann, causing small but steady 
losses, while Shorthose pushed a detachment under Maj. Hawkins towards Abdallah-kwa-Nanga east 
of Liwale.127 
Van Deventer now hoped that Norforce would be able to cut off any escape by Tafel. By now, 
this was an optimistic assumption and undermined by the problems of extended supply lines of 
another 80 kilometres. This was made more difficult by the decision to withdraw all the Belgians back 




   
November began with promise as Hawthorn’s attack managed to catch Otto off-guard and 
Hawthorn took 24 prisoners and a machine gun near Luwegu. Hawkins’s detachment linked up with a 
Belgian battalion at Liwale, while Murray began to patrol along the Songea–Liwale road.129 By the 
middle of the month, it was obvious that Tafel was in the process of moving south. While Northey 
was ready, he was hampered by the fact that the enemy were moving along an arc at the limit of his 
supply reach. He simply could not feed his troops beyond this line, and both Fair and Hawthorn had 
lost touch with the enemy. Murray was ordered to Abdallah-kwa-Nanga in an attempt to cut off Tafel, 
but the latter had a head start.130  
The race was on and Tafel arrived first, heading the half battalion at Abdallah- kwa-Nanga with 
about 10 companies. Hawkins’s men of 1/4th KAR fought gallantly and were supported by a Belgian 
column from Liwale and then Shorthose himself. Heavily outnumbered, the detachment had inflicted 
many casualties on the attackers and had disrupted their move south. Most important was the seizure 
of a copy of Tafel’s orders for the move south. This was invaluable information that was quickly sent 
to Van Deventer. With the chance of cutting the Schutztruppe in half, Northey instructed Murray to 
attack any enemy within range of Tunduru while Hawthorn was moved back to Songea, in reserve, 
and to be ready to return to Nyasaland if necessary. The NRP were instructed to take over Mahenge 
from the Belgians and provide the occupying force there.131 Much needed reinforcements in the form 
of 2nd RNR, some 500 strong, joined 1st RNR at Mbamba Bay for training and operations.132 
Norforce spent the remainder of the month redeploying its columns and patrolling vigorously. 
With Tafel out of range, it could do little more than to remain poised to strike at any enemy 
detachments that came within reach. However, with Lettow’s capture of Ngomano, on the Rovuma 
River, and advance into Portuguese East Africa, a move back to Nyasaland appeared highly likely. 
Fortunately, Van Deventer’s forces managed to trap Tafel near the border where he surrendered on 
27 November.133 The Schutztruppe had been cut in half, but still remained dangerous. 
 
9. The drive into Portuguese East Africa: December 1917–May 1918  
The month of December was spent largely in reorganisation as the heavy rain put paid to further 
operations. Northey paused to reflect on the military situation, noting that his main column under 
Hawthorn was at the limit of its supply near Likopolwe while Murray’s Rhodesian/KAR column 
stationed on the Wiedhafen–Songea–Tunduru line saw no sign of the enemy.134 Northey resolved to 
continue pushing Hawthorn as far east towards Luambala as possible, subject to the difficult supply 
situation and the continuing rain.135 There were other important considerations too: his experienced 
KAR battalions were worn out after several years in the field, 2/4th KAR had to be pulled back to 
receive more than 400 reinforcements, while its sister battalion, 1/4th KAR was equally in need of a 
rest.136 
With the flooding of the Rovuma River and a lack of a developed sea base in Portuguese East 
Africa, the main body under Van Deventer was largely forced to halt and consolidate. Norforce now 
became the principal striking arm, although it too had to contend with the tropical monsoon. With the 
difficult conditions, the best that Northey could do was to push a limited force north-eastwards from 
Nyasaland while a two battalion-sized column, known as Rosecol, moved westwards from Porto 
Amelia under the newly established Pamforce. Col. Hawthorn was chosen to lead the move with 1/1st 
and 2/1st KAR ranged against the eight companies of Abt. Wahle and Kraut around Luambala. To ease 
his supply problems, Northey also sought, unsuccessfully, to hand over responsibility of the Songea–
Tunduru area and concentrate his troops in Nyasaland. For the time being, his troops remained spread 
out in two major groupings, some hundreds of kilometres apart. On a personal note, on 1 January 
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1918, Northey’s services were recognised by promotion to Major General for “distinguished services 
in the field”.137  
 
 
Map 4: Operations in Portuguese East Africa (December 1917–March 1918) 
 
Hawthorn marched north on 3 January to dislodge Abt. Wahle from its food gathering mission 
around the River Lugenda. His two battalions threatened the Germans, and Lettow despatched 
reinforcements in the form of Abt. Otto from Chirumba, while the 2nd Cape Corps moved on 
Mwembe.138 However, Hawthorn was determined and, despite the swollen rivers, he was able to 
outmanoeuvre Wahle from a strong position. The latter withdrew eastwards before Otto could arrive 
and the British were able to occupy Likopolwe and then Luambala by 18 January. The immediate goal 
was achieved, but Hawthorn could not advance further owing to a lack of carriers and the 
deteriorating road conditions.139 Elsewhere, 1/4th and 2/4th KAR were brought down by steamer to 
Fort Johnston to rest and prepare for future operations.140 
Hawthorn’s advance had deprived Lettow of an important food-growing area and influenced his 
decision to concentrate further east in the Nanungu area. With supplies becoming short for the 
Germans, the British advance was both unexpected and disconcerting.141 In the east, Rosecol was now 
operating some 80 kilometres west of Porto Amelia, but was too small to dislodge the enemy. Lettow 




   
Using the period of reduced operational activity, Northey inspected his lines of communication 
back in Nyasaland. Uncharacteristically, he found matters to be unsatisfactory and he summarily 
replaced the officer in charge with an experienced businessman turned soldier. Matters were soon 
sorted out and the rear areas returned to their accustomed efficiency. Other problems included the loss 
of a number of his experienced Southern Rhodesian troops as their engagements had expired. The two 
RNR battalions now merged into one unit more than 1 000 strong bearing the 1st RNR title, but the 
new troops were inexperienced and needed further training. A major blow was the loss of Col. Murray 
who was invalided out with a heart problem. Even though he was not always popular with his officers 
owing to his hard-driving ways, he had been one of the best and most reliable column commanders 
over the previous two years and would be missed. Indeed, Northey later described him as “one of the 
finest soldiers I have ever come across”. Col. Carbutt, formerly of the RNR, took over his 
appointment.143 
In early February, Northey was summoned to a conference with General Van Deventer in 
Beira, Portuguese East Africa. There they discussed the best means of ending the campaign while 
tackling the thorny issue of how to employ their Portuguese allies with the least danger.144 Northey 
advocated his own method, that of incorporating small detachments within his own columns. The C-
in-C also outlined his plans for 1918 with the aim of driving the Germans south of the Porto Amelia–
Mtengule line. Northey noted that this still gave the enemy plenty of room for manoeuvre: 
I said I should do all possible to carry out this plan: in fact I have nearly done my share 
of it already. But it is 400 miles [650 kilometres] across from the Indian Ocean to Lake 
Nyasa, and the extent of country is enormous, so that one cannot guarantee that in 
establishing the proposed line, one can keep the enemy south of it. 145 
Northey realised that conditions were far from ideal as the Germans maintained their usual 
tactics of delay while his own supply lines were stretched to the maximum, the heaviest rains were 
falling and sickness was rife. Nevertheless, his troops remained in good heart and continued to fight 
hard, causing the enemy a constant stream of casualties.146 But even he had to bow to the inevitable 
and ordered a pause in which to bring up supplies to the areas of Luambala and Mtarika in order to 
supply the forward troops on the Lujenda. This still meant keeping as large a striking force as possible 
forward, but under the circumstances it could be little more than a battalion. Hawthorn’s experienced 
troops were suffering too, and 1/1st KAR was withdrawn into reserve, having served for over three 
and a half years in the field. 2/1st KAR was in similar condition, but had to continue for the time 
being.147 
Despite the appalling conditions, Hawthorn continued to press as far east as his supply lines 
would allow him. On 22 February, Hawthorn, now some 240 kilometres from his base and some 120 
kilometres east of Luambala, hit Wahle and Kraut hard. Unfortunately, on the coast, Rosecol was 
stalled for lack of transport and could not exploit the success.148 But, the combination of British 
pressure and German supply difficulties lead to the increased concentration of the Schutztruppe 
around Nanungu.149 As this shift took place, Northey was preparing for the next phase of his effort 
and shifted troops east and south of Fort Johnston towards Malokotera and Regone–Inagu. These were 
intended to deny the areas to Lettow’s foragers while detecting any moves to the south. He realised 
the futility of trying to anticipate Lettow’s movements and instead kept his two resting KAR 
battalions in readiness to move towards the Zambezi River. As ever, he considered the best defence of 
his lines of communication an aggressive posture some 160 kilometres inland although he remained 
rightly disappointed with the progress of Rosecol.150 
The latter force continued to move slowly inland during March while Norforce spent much of 
the time collecting supplies and the carriers to move them forward. The next objective was Msalu in 
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coordination with Pamforce from Medo. Despite these efforts, the most that Northey could supply 
were three columns of about 300 rifles each, operating from Mtarika, Luambala and Namweras. These 
troops would move to their extreme limit of supply while constantly seeking to hit the Germans.151  
March continued to experience the heavy rains that seriously impeded the planned movements 
and made the crossing of rivers difficult. At the end of the month, reports were received that Germans 
intended to break north and evade the planned British squeeze. Northey accordingly resolved to move 
early and not to await the start of Pamforce’s own move. He saw his mission as preventing the enemy 
from breaking either west or north while Pamforce pushed towards Nanungu.152 
By the middle of April, with his forward columns still pressing on in the sodden conditions, 
Northey had to face another intractable problem – the lack of carriers. He needed an extra 5 000 
carriers just to get forward of Mtarika–Mahua and these carriers were simply not forthcoming. The 
crops were not due to ripen until May at the earliest and this constrained his options. Still, he resolved 
to keep up the pressure despite the risks to his relatively small forward detachments.153 
It took 11 days to traverse his lines of communication from front to rear with only a single 
platoon available for its protection. More defenders would have simply consumed the rations needed 
for the front.154 By 26 April, Pamforce was closing in on Lettow’s main body around Nanungu while 
3/1st KAR under Col. Barton moved on to support from the west. Several days later, a German raid on 
those vulnerable lines of communication disrupted preparations, but prompt action restored the 
situation. On 4 May, 3/1st KAR was ready to strike Nanungu. 
 
 
Map 5: Operations in Portuguese East Africa (April–June 1918) 
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It was to be a savage fight as the battalion initially surprised the Germans, before a heavy 
counter attack. The fighting went on until nightfall, with numerous casualties, but by daybreak, the 
KAR were in possession of the field and the enemy had withdrawn. The action cost 3/1st KAR more 
than 100 casualties, but it had given the enemy a similar number, losses that could be ill afforded by 
the Germans.155 
Owing to the length of Norforce’s supply lines, much of the fight fell to Pamforce, with 3/1st 
KAR, now under Col. Griffiths, taken under the former’s command and continuing the pursuit. On 22 
May, the battalion ran into the enemy rear guard near Korewa, south of Nanungu. It was heavily 
counter-attacked, but held on while the remainder of the column came into battle. Once again, it was a 
bloody success with the capture of a large number of enemy soldiers, carriers and equipment. 
Elsewhere, Northey had sent out a number of patrols to deny the enemy food and to act as an early 
warning.156 
At the end of May, as the Schutztruppe moved south, Northey regrouped his forces with the 
main striking elements of four battalions under Hawthorn (2/1st, 3/1st and 1/4th KAR with NRP) while 
he retained direct control of 2/4th KAR at Mulanje–Regone, 2nd Cape Corps securing Mwembe, plus 
3/4th KAR guarding Songea-Tunduru and two others in reserve (1/1st and 2/1st KAR).157 He was now 
ready to hit them as soon as they came into range. By early June, the German-led elements were 
approaching lightly held Malema, which was evacuated after a stout defence. With troops of both 
sides approaching from all directions, Northey thought it time to give the column commanders more 
freedom to act: 
It appears to me that the Campaign seems now to have reached a stage when elaborate 
plans for cooperation worked out on a map are useless and only cause delay … Each to 
act on initiative of its own commander who should have orders to take up offensive 
vigorously against any enemy within reach, without waiting for each other or their 
superior's orders. The main thing is to regain the initiative and give enemy no respite.158 
In a major converging movement, Pamforce continued to drive south and east towards Malema 
with 1/4th KAR pressing in from the west and 2/4th KAR from the south. By 15 June, 1/4th KAR had 
reached Malema while 3/1st KAR continued to pursue the enemy. Northey also began to reinforce 
other posts around the area with the aim of disrupting any advance, but the bulk of fighting units came 
under Pamforce’s command. This unaccustomed inactivity however also marked the end of Gen. 
Northey’s tenure as he had been selected as the next governor of the East Africa Protectorate, later to 
be renamed Kenya Colony. He handed over command to Brig. Gen. Hawthorn, and departed for 
Chinde on 28 June 1918. While much hard marching and several severe fights remained before the 
war ended in November, Northey had had a successful tenure in command.159 His valuable services 
were recognised with the king presenting him the Companion of the Order of the Bath (CB) in 
September and then a knighthood in the grade of a Knight Commander of the Most Distinguished 
Order of Saint Michael and Saint George  (KCMG) in December 1918.160 
 
10. Conclusions 
In assessing Brig. Gen. Northey’s two and half years in command of Norforce, his achievements must 
be measured against the challenges of his environment and his opponent. In a campaign that was 
marked by hardship and extreme difficulties for all participants, Norforce was particularly challenged 
by the tyranny of distance and terrain. Essentially a large infantry brigade, it had to operate its own 
base and sustain itself successfully over 2 600 kilometres in the rear area just to reach the northern 
borders of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. From there, Norforce HQ had to maintain the fighting 
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troops several hundred kilometres into the forward zone often with two or three main columns 
separated by 200 to 320 kilometres of dense bush and mountains. The extremes of climate ranged 
from the cold and wet mountain highlands between Mwaya and Iringa to the hot and steamy 
floodplains of the Ulanga basin. Tropical diseases and voracious insects made life very unpleasant for 
all.  
In the Schutztruppe, Northey faced a professional and well-trained force that was highly 
proficient in bush warfare. Once its fixed bases had been lost in 1916, it kept on the move, albeit 
mainly constrained by the need to seek new sources of food. Frequently trying to trade space for time, 
Lettow never lost his penchant for attacking and destroying any isolated or small detachments found 
in his way. In the attack, the Germans made excellent use of machine guns, conducting outflanking 
movements through the bush to envelop a position. When on the defence, the Schutztruppe was 
skilled at constructing strong positions that would be held tenaciously with sudden and fierce counter-
attacks to restore any losses. Then, before being surrounded, it would slip away into the bush at the 
last minute. It would remain a dangerous, if much diminished, foe right up until the end of the 
campaign in 1918.  
Isolated from the relative abundance of manpower, equipment and material provided to the 
main British force in the north, Norforce was always the poor relation of the theatre. But Northey took 
this as a professional challenge and met it ably. He showed particular ability in the management of his 
lines of communication while using the good relations established with colonial governments to ensure 
the regular production of food and steady recruitment of carriers. He grasped the importance of mobility 
as he continually sought to extend his road network so that the MT could move supplies as far forward 
as possible before the carriers had to take over. This was complemented by excellent and innovative use 
of his motor vehicles, both tactically and logistically. Furthermore, he employed the small squadron of 
steamers on Lake Nyasa to very good effect to support the campaign in the southern area as well as in 
Portuguese East Africa.  
While his troops certainly experienced their fair share of hunger and privation, shortages were 
usually temporary and were overcome by adjustments to the lines of communication. Medically, 
Norforce also suffered heavily from disease and the climate, but still managed to maintain its mobility 
and fighting effectiveness even during the wet seasons. This was in stark contrast with the virtual 
collapse of the main force in the north during late 1916 to early 1917. Whatever the difficulties, 
Northey’s troops never lost faith in their commander’s ability and determination to do the best for them. 
As a thinking professional soldier, he used his previous experiences on the Western Front, 
especially the effects of modern weapons, to good effect, and instilled the same into his subordinates. He 
adapted well to the African environment, recognising that detached columns, controlled by wireless, 
were essential to success. He also understood the need to inflict attrition on the Schutztruppe and to deny 
it access to food.  
Northey appreciated the importance of supporting the main force in the north and often took 
risks in doing so, but tempered these by thorough and meticulous planning beforehand. He was over-
extended at Iringa in November 1916 and was seriously threatened with defeat by Wahle from the 
west and Kraut from the east. But he managed to out-manoeuvre Kraut while holding enough ground 
against Wahle, so that the threat soon passed. Northey was able to regain his balance and used this 
tactical mobility to isolate and then capture several important enemy groups.  
The breakout of Wintgens in 1917 tested Northey’s ability to manage two isolated forces 
separated by huge distances. Despite the former’s head start, Murray’s column hounded Wintgens for 
much of the way and, if Murray was unable to destroy the raiders, it was still an extraordinary effort. 
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Likewise, operations in the southern area in mid- and late-1917 took much determination and effort 
before clearing the enemy out of the Mpepo and Mahenge areas. These were characteristic of Northey’s 
operations: bold advances with widely separated columns that were backed by careful and methodical 
administrative planning.  
Norforce was instrumental in assisting the capture of Tafel’s force in late 1917 and then became 
the primary striking force in Portuguese East Africa in early 1918. By that stage, column commanders 
were given greater freedom to chase the elusive Schutztruppe and the whole focus of support had to be 
shifted southwards. Northey’s troops would continue their offensive operations until the end of his 
command. He was certainly aided by the high quality of his column commanders, especially Murray and 
Hawthorn. These were hard-driving, tough and reliable officers who could be entrusted to overcome 
enormous difficulties. But, their selection also reflected Northey’s skill in choosing subordinates, as 
those he deemed to be unequal to the task were quickly removed. This was an important factor in 
running such a mixed and varied force spread over such vast areas. 
Northey’s personal qualities played an important role in his success. He was certainly a 
determined, tough and daring commander who commanded considerable respect. Although a realist, he 
maintained cheerful optimism in the face of tremendous physical adversary and apparently impossible 
challenges. He tempered risk-taking with careful and thorough planning. Consequently, he was able to 
react to the unexpected in a timely and effective fashion. He had the important ability to get on well with 
‘colonials’ and units from completely different backgrounds. 
He also presided over a notable expansion of his locally raised forces between 1917 and 1918 
with the growth of the 1st KAR and the 1st RNR. Together with the raw 5th SAI, these troops were 
trained in Nyasaland before being launched into the fighting line with varying degrees of success. If not 
as experienced as their worn-out predecessors, they learned on the battlefield and were invaluable in 
harrying the Schutztruppe incessantly.  
To evaluate Northey’s performance: he clearly fulfilled his main mission of securing northern 
Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia from the enemy. Thereafter, he remained tactically agile and 
supported the advance of the main British force with considerable vigour. He showed aggression and 
determination in pushing the enemy hard. Operationally he was successful in clearing much of the 
southern part of German East Africa throughout 1916 and 1917, and subsequently Portuguese East 
Africa during 1917 and 1918. While he was unable to inflict a knockout blow on the Schutztruppe, he 
hit them hard on a number of occasions while avoiding any serious defeats for his force. He kept up 
the pressure throughout and helped to reduce the enemy to a rump force by mid-1918.  
Norforce achieved a great deal with very slender resources and little fanfare in one of the 
most difficult environments of the war. This success may be attributed to Northey’s professional skill 
and leadership, as well as a force of highly determined and capable troops. Handing over command 
before the end of the war and always a modest man, Edward Northey never achieved the wider public 
acclaim which was his due. But, based on his consistently successful and aggressive performance, he 
must be considered the outstanding British commander of the East African campaign. Both he and 
Norforce deserve full credit for their remarkable military achievements.  
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